







Wireless network measurement challenges


David Kotz

Department of Computer Science
Institute for Security Technology Studies
Dartmouth College

Lots of wireless devices...









= lots of wireless traffic...









Why measure?







- Operational
 - observe misbehaving/misconfigured/cheating users
 - capture and detect 802.11 MAC-layer attacks
 - capacity planning, trouble shooting
- Research
 - understand devices: VoIP phones, gaming devices, ...
 - develop better MAC protocols and mobility models
- Note: wireless is not wired!
 - new usage patterns, more mobility, different connectivity



Measure








Measure Merge



Measure

Merge

Analyse









Measure





Merge

Analyse

Publish





Measure



Merge

Analyse

Publish



Wireless measurement is hard


- hearing all wireless frames is hard
 - radio range/interference, loss, reflections
 - data flows can be huge (54Mbps and rising)
- lack of portable tools, standard data formats, open driver interfaces
- modern APs can dynamically alter power levels and channel assignment
- we need to sniff the air...

Why sniff the air?

- Why not measure wired side of APs?
 - only observe bridged traffic
 - no management traffic, errors, attacks, etc
 - only observe known networks
 - only observe 802.11



“sniffing the air”



What's wrong with existing tools?

- Don't hear everything
 - war-driving only needs to hear beacons
- Aren't tested
 - often just use data frames to test performance
- Don't scale
 - many commercial products designed with multiple sensors, but only few packet captures at a time

Case study: MobiSys 2005

- deployed 3 multi-radio wireless sniffers
 - no wired network connectivity: hard to reconfigure
- Problems:
 - AP channels were reconfigured multiple times during conference
 - sniffers were not optimally positioned
- Result: lossy/corrupted data set

How could we do better?

- sniffers could be aware of changes in network configuration
 - e.g., AP changes channel → sniffer changes channel
- sniffers could be reconfigured remotely
 - without wired connectivity
- sniffers could be optimally positioned
 - or leverage existence of other sniffers to aid capture

Problem: channel sampling

- 14 channels (802.11b/g), 20+ channels (802.11a)
- Each sniffer can only listen to one channel
 - But interesting traffic may be on other channels
- Channel-hop strategically
 - spend more time on “interesting” channels
 - e.g., highest frames/bytes/ESSIDs/BSSIDs/STAs/IBSSes
 - e.g., track a particular ESSID/BSSID/STA
 - e.g., largest change in a particular metric
 - e.g., non-802.11 signals (Bluetooth/microwave/etc.)


e.g., Equal/Time

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	---	---	---	---	---	---


e.g., Proportional/FrameCount

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Hear more on relevant channels




equal






proportional

Hear relevant frames


Sampling captures more attack frames




Measure



Merge







Analyse




Publish




Multiple sniffers, multiple captures




Multiple sniffers, multiple captures




Multiple sniffers, multiple captures




Multiple sniffers, multiple captures




Multiple sniffers, multiple captures



Multiple sniffers, multiple captures



Multiple sniffers, multiple captures




Implementation

- Use beacon frames to synchronise clocks
 - this is difficult!
 - use TSF Timer as well as system clock
- Use FCS as keys in hash table
 - is this sufficient?
- Need to keep track of retransmits, reordering

Merging gives more realistic view

Fewer false alarms with merging









Measure

Merge

Analyse

Publish



Problem: measurement loss

How do we know if we see a true picture of the air?







- how to verify that measurement is working?
 - e.g., what if sniffer is badly positioned?
- parse sniffer output to look for loss
 - recreate 802.11 FSM
 - e.g., look for DATA-ACK, RTS-CTS, etc
 - come up with 'single number' 'executive summary'
 - i.e., move sniffer around until number is higher

Measure

Merge

Analyse

Publish



So, what do we do
with all this data
we've collected?



CRAWDAD

<http://crawdad.cs.dartmouth.edu>

- Community Resource for Archiving Wireless Data At Dartmouth
 - Provide data for researchers, and tools to make it easy to collect more data
- 257 registered users
 - approximately 119 universities, 26 companies
- 13 data sets, and more coming
 - infrastructure/MANET/VANET/Bluetooth/etc.

Problem: sanitising wireless traces

- Need to remove identifiable information from traces before release
 - federal (IRB) requirements, privacy risks, etc.
- Is it possible to “anonymise?”
 - how much is enough?
- Our tools:
 - remove everything >L4
 - sanitise IP addresses (prefix-preserving IP anonymisation, Xu et. al., ICNP 2002)
 - sanitise 802.11 identifiers (MAC addresses, ESSIDs)

Challenges

- How can we best leverage multiple sniffers?
- How can we correlate with other data sources:
 - syslog, snmp, RADIUS, call manager, user location
- How can we verify that we are measuring well?
- How do we extract realistic mobility models?
- How can we protect users' privacy?
- How do we relate MACs to “users”?
- How do we identify different device types?
- How can we share the captured data?

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