U-Prove ID Escrow Extension

Draft Revision 1

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Summary

This document extends the U-Prove Cryptographic Specification [UPCS] by specifying an ID escrow capability.

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Change history

Version	Description
Draft Revision 1	09/11/2013 Initial draft

1 Introduction

This document extends the U-Prove Cryptographic Specification [UPCS] by specifying an identity escrow mechanism.

The U-Prove identity escrow feature allows a U-Prove token to be presented anonymously to a Verifier, but the presentation contains the token holder's identity in an encrypted form. This allows the presentation proof to be de-anonymized if needed. The decryption key needed for de-anonymization is ideally held at arm's length from the system, by an entity distinct from the Issuer and Verifier called the Auditor. The Auditor is only involved in the rare occasions when de-anonymization is required.

To prevent users[1] from encrypting junk data instead of their identity, the presentation proof with ID escrow includes an additional proof that the encryption of the identity is valid. In this context, valid means i) the ciphertext was computed correctly, following the encryption algorithm, and ii) the plaintext is an attribute from the U-Prove token. For example, the Issuer will ensure that the 2nd attribute in the token always contains a user ID. The proof will give the Verifier assurance that the ciphertext is an encryption of this attribute. This type of encryption is sometimes called *verifiable encryption*, since parties without the decryption key may verify some property of the plaintext. U-Prove's ID escrow is however, not a general purpose verifiable encryption scheme, since the plaintext must have a special form to allow efficient decryption.

1.1 Notation

This document will reference the U-Prove cryptographic specification [UPCS]. Notation will be re-used when possible. In protocol descriptions, the statement "Verify **X**" indicates that an error should be returned and the protocol aborted if **X** does not hold. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].

1.2 Feature overview

The identity will be escrowed by encrypting a pseudonym for the user, using Elgamal encryption. Since the pseudonym is a group element, it is a valid plaintext for the Elgamal scheme, and since it has a special form, the user can prove that it corresponds to an attribute from the token. Let H be an element of G_q, the public key of the Auditor, and let x_b be an attribute from the user's token used to create a pseudonym $P_b = g^{x_b}$ (where g is the group generator). During presentation, the user will encrypt P_b, as $(E_1, E_2) = (g^r, P_b H^r)$, then prove that (E_1, E_2) is a valid encryption of P_b and that P_b was created correctly.

The ciphertext, along with the associated proof of correctness, the token T, and the U-Prove presentation proof (where x_b is undisclosed), will form the presentation proof with identity escrow. The ciphertext can be stored at the Verifier, and if necessary, the Auditor can decrypt it, using the private key associated with H. Depending on how the pseudonym is formed, it may be enough to identify the user, or additional information from the Issuer may be required to link the pseudonym to an identity.

The ID escrow feature is designed as a U-Prove extension that will take a commitment to x_b as input, denoted C_{x_b}. The extension will produce a ciphertext encrypting the pseudonym $P_b = g^{x_b}$ along with proof that P_b is consistent with C_{x_b}. This commitment will be part of the U-Prove presentation proof (which links C_{x_b} to the ID escrow attribute). We detail the identity escrow extension in five steps.

i) *Auditor setup*: key generation by the Auditor.

[1] The User is referred to as the Prover in [UPCS].

ii) *Issuance*: the U-Prove issuance protocol is mostly unchanged, but some information is logged by the Issuer for use during decryption/audit.

iii) *Presentation*: standard U-Prove proof generation step including a commitment to the ID escrow attribute, then the ID escrow ciphertext is created along with proof that it is valid.

iv) *Verification*: the Verifier includes additional steps to verify the ciphertext is valid (after performing the standard U-Prove verification step).

v) *Decryption: (in case of abuse)* The Auditor receives the ciphertext and decrypts it, after performing the required checks.

The system's decryption key may easily be divided amongst two or more Auditors, such that no single Auditor may decrypt ID escrow ciphertexts without the cooperation of one or more of the other Auditors. This is possible since the encryption scheme is based on Elgamal, which allows the private key to be split using either (i) a simple additive secret sharing scheme (for *k*-of-*k* decryption), or (ii) a polynomial secret sharing scheme such as Shamir's (for *k*-of-*n* decryption, where $n \geq k$).

2 Protocol specification

2.1 Auditor Setup

The Auditor generates an Elgamal key pair as setup. The group parameters desc(G_q) MUST match the Issuer parameters that will be used to create tokens. It is also recommended that the Auditor create a policy, describing the values required with a ciphertext, and the conditions under which identity will be revealed. This policy should be bound to the ciphertext during creation.

AuditorSetup( )

Input

Parameters: desc(G_q)

Computation

Choose x at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$
Compute $H := g^x$
Store x securely

Output

Return H

Figure 1: Function `AuditorSetup`.

2.2 Token Issuance

Token issuance follows the same steps as in [UPCS]. One of the attributes, called the *identity escrow attribute* and denoted x_b, is reserved for identity escrow,. It is RECOMMENDED that the value x_b be chosen at random by the Prover. The *identity escrow pseudonym* is defined as $P_b = g^{x_b}$. The Issuer must know P_b. The Issuer MAY keep a table of (P_b, ID) pairs, so when presented a P_b value later by the Auditor it can look up the true identity associated with the pseudonym.

In an alternative implementation where the Issuer does not have to store anything, the attribute x_b is chosen from a relatively small set of possible values (for example, of size less than 2^{60}) that uniquely identify the user, such as a social security number. This allows $\log_g P_b$ to be computed, revealing x_b and identifying the user. This approach also allows possible x_b values to be tested against a given P_b (we can efficiently test whether $P_b = g^{x_b}$).

2.3 Presentation

The presentation proof is generated according the needs of the application following [UPCS], but additionally x_b is a committed attribute. The (public) output $C_b = g^{x_b} g_1^{o_b}$ and the (private) opening information (x_b, o_b), are input to the function `IEProve` (Figure 2). The additional information field *info* allows arbitrary data to be bound to the ciphertext, since it is required to verify the presentation proof. Examples include: the entire presentation proof (if it will be sent to the Auditor), a certificate for the Auditor public key, or the Auditor's decryption policy.

IEProve( )

Input

Parameters: UID_P, desc(G_q), $\text{UID}_\mathcal{H}$, g_1
Commitment to x_b: C_b
Opening information: x_b, o_b
Token identifier: $\text{UID}_\mathcal{T}$
Auditor public key: H
Additional information: $info$

Computation

Choose r, r', x_b' and o_b' at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$
$E_1 := g^r$
$E_2 := g^{x_b} H^r$
$C_b' := g^{x_b'} g_1^{o_b'}$
$E_1' := g^{r'}$
$E_2' := g^{x_b'} H^{r'}$
$c := \mathcal{H}(\text{UID}_\text{P}, \text{UID}_\mathcal{T}, H, C_b, E_1, E_2, C_b', E_1', E_2', info)$
$r_b := x_b' - c x_b \pmod q$
$r_r := r' - cr \pmod q$
$r_o := o_b' - c o_b \pmod q$

Output

Return $(E_1, E_2, c, r_b, r_r, r_o)$

Figure 2: Function **IEProve**.

The first two fields of the hash, UID_P and UID_T, serve to uniquely identify the Issuer parameters and the token, respectively.

2.4 Verification

The verification function of the identity escrow module is called `IEVerify` (Figure 3). The verify step is run after the presentation proof has been successfully verified. Inputs to `IEVerify` are the commitment C_b from the presentation proof and the output of `IEProve`. If the presentation proof is valid, `IEVerify` has assurance that C_b is a valid commitment to the attribute x_b. Note that r_{x_b} is used in two places, to prove that the same value is used in E_2 and C_{x_b}.

IEVerify( )

Input

Parameters: UID_P, desc(G_q), $\text{UID}_\mathcal{H}$, g_1
Commitment to x_b: C_b
Token identifier: $\text{UID}_\mathcal{T}$
Auditor public key: H
Additional information: $info$
Output of IEProve(): $(E_1, E_2, c, r_b, r_r, r_o)$

Computation

Verify that $E_1$and E_2 are valid elements of G_q
Verify that r_b, r_r, r_o are valid elements of $\mathbb{Z}_\text{q}$
Verify that c has the correct length
$C_b'' := \left(g^{r_b} g_1^{r_o}\right)(C_b)^c$
$E_1'' := (g^{r_r})(E_1)^c$
$E_2'' := (g^{r_b} H^{r_r})(E_2)^c$
$c' := \mathcal{H}(\text{UID}_\text{P}, \text{UID}_\mathcal{T}, H, C_b, E_1, E_2, C_b'', E_1'', E_2''$,*info*)

Output

Verify that $c = c'$

Figure 3: Function `IEVerify`.

2.5 Decryption

To de-anonymize a Prover, the Verifier sends the output of `IEProve` to the Auditor, and at least UID_T, but optionally the token and the entire presentation proof. The Auditor verifies proof, and reads any policy information encoded in the *info* field of the proof. If the request satisfies the decryption policy, the Auditor runs the `IEVerify`, to ensure that the ciphertext is valid, and consistent with the presentation proof. If valid, the Auditor decrypts the ciphertext (E_1, E_2) as shown in Figure 4.

AuditorDecrypt( )

Input

Inputs to `IEVerify`: UID_P, desc(G_q), $\text{UID}_\mathcal{H}$, g_1, C_b, $\text{UID}_\mathcal{T}$, H,*info* , $(E_1, E_2, c, r_b, r_r, r_o)$
Auditor secret key: x

Computation

Verify that *info* is valid (RECOMMENDED)
Verify the ID escrow proof with `IEVerify`
$P_b := E_2 E_1^{-x}$

Output

Return P_b

Figure 4: Function `AuditorDecrypt`.

How the output P_b is then used to uniquely identify a user is implementation dependent, and is not specified here.

3 Security Considerations

In addition to the security considerations of [UPCS], implementers should also consider the following.

Auditor Setup

For security, in the case when G_q is an elliptic curve group, it MUST NOT have a pairing which can be computed efficiently. It is recommended to use the U-Prove parameters defined in [UPRPP] which do not have this issue.

Provers will need an authentic copy of H and the policy. Note that the Issuer should not act as an authority to certify H, since we want separation between the Issuer and Auditor. Distributing H with authenticity is the usual bootstrapping problem, and may be done, for example, with a CA/PKI, or H may be embedded in Prover devices, or distributed as part of an authenticated software package.

Token Issuance

Based on the policy set by the Auditor, the Issuer should regularly purge old values from the table. For example, if the policy states that the identity may be revealed for a period of up to one month following the use of the token, and the token expires in one month, then the Issuer should delete the table entry after two months. Keeping a minimal amount of data in this table limits the potential for abuse in the event of the Auditor's secret key being exposed.

Choosing a different x_b value for each token also limits the damage of an Auditor compromise, since transactions will then only be linkable by the Issuer. If a single x_b value is used for all of user's tokens, then P_b is the same for all presentation proofs, allowing them to be linked, given the Auditor secret key. To simplify storage and management of one x_b value per token, x_b can be computed as a function of the token secret key (and other token-specific information, like an index/counter). The Issuer will have to keep all the P_b values corresponding to a given identity.

Presentation

No comments specific to presentation.

Decryption

In terms of information relayed from the Verifier to the Auditor, at the very least, the Auditor should know when the proof was created and which Verifier it was presented to (which may differ from the Verifier who is presenting the ciphertext to the Auditor). It is also recommended that the policy information encoded in *info*, be checked by the Auditor. Without these checks the Auditor becomes a simple decryption oracle, and Verifiers alone are trusted to decide whether a user should be de-anonymized, making the system open to abuse by dishonest or compromised Verifiers.

References

[RFC2119] Scott Bradner. *RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels*, 1997. ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2119.txt.

[UPCS] Christian Paquin, Greg Zaverucha. *U-Prove Cryptographic Specification V1.1*. Revision 2 Microsoft, April 2013. http://www.microsoft.com/u-prove.

[UPRPP] Christian Paquin. *U-Prove Recommended Parameters Profile V1.1 (Revision 2)*. Microsoft, April 2013. http://www.microsoft.com/u-prove.