Buying Drugs for Science: Addressing the Economics of Cybercrime

Stefan Savage UC San Diego

joint work w/Neha Chachra, Brandon Enright, Mark Felegyhazi (ICSI), Chris Grier (Berkeley), Tristan Halvorson, Chris Kanich, Christian Kreibich (ICSI), Kirill Levchenko, He "Lonnie" Liu, Justin Ma, Damon McCoy, Vern Paxson (ICSI/Berkeley), Andreas Pitsillidis, Geoff Voelker, and Nick Weaver (ICSI)

The traditional view of security

- Computer security is a technical problem
 - There are some software or design flaws
 - These flaws can be exploited by adversaries
- If we fix these technical problems then we will be secure

 But you better get them all because the adversary is adaptive...

But, today's best practices...






... have not stopped our adversaries






Profit driven e-crime

The largest driver for threats is \$\$\$




Today: the spam ecosystem



Affiliate program structure

- Division of labor
 - Affiliates handle advertising (e.g., spam, SEO)
 - Independent contractors
 - Paid 25-60% commission depending on kind of program
 - Affiliate programs handle backend
 - Payment processing, customer service, fulfillment
 - Sometimes hosting and domain registration
- Why?
 - Transfer of risk: innovation risk vs investment risk
 - Specialization lowers cost structure

Heavy-tailed revenue



Affiliate program cost structure Example: RX-Promotion

Direct costs: 70.8%

Indirect costs: 12.8%

Profit: 16.3%

RX-Promotion	1
March – September	2010


Gross revenue	\$7.8M	
Direct costs	\$5.5M	(70.8%)
Commissions	\$3M	(38.1%)
Suppliers ^a	\$1.4M	(17.6%)
Processing	\$1M	(13.2%)
Other direct	\$148.3K	(1.9%)
Indirect costs	\$1004K	(12.8%)
Administrative	\$197K	(2.5%)
Customer service	\$124K	(1.6%)
Fines	\$107K	(1.4%)
IT expenses	\$202K	(2.6%)
Domains	\$114K	(1.5%)
Servers, hosting	\$66K	(0.8%)
Selling expenses	\$315K	(4%)
Marketing	\$105K	(1.3%)
Lobbying	\$157K	(2%)
Other indirect	\$134K	(1.7%)
Net revenue	\$1.3M	(16.3%)



Click Trajectories

- Click Trajectory project
 - Find "bottlenecks" in the spam value chain
 - Place where intervention could be most effective
 - Resources with largest impact on profitability
 - Highest switching cost for adversary
- Measure empirically
 - Resources needed to monetize each piece of spam
 - By playing the role of customer; at scale
 - Three domains: pharma, replica, software





- Click Trajectories study [Levchenko, IEEE S&P 2011]
- Aug 1 -- Oct 31 2010
- 7 URL/Spam feeds + 5 botnet feeds
 - 968M URLs, 17M domains
 - 99% of pharma, OEM, replica
- Crawled domains for 98% of URLs in
 - 1000s of Firefox instances
 - Large IP address diversity
- Hundreds of purchases
 - Unique card # per order
 - Full transaction data

Example: What if you ordered from these guys?



ALL PRODUCTS ABOUT US HOW TO ORDER TESTIMONIALS FAQ CONTACTS

Bank Identification Number (BIN) 448314



Merchant descriptor "Smart rt online"

Card Acceptor ID "8875236"

Merchant Category Code (MCC) 5912 **Drug Stores & Pharmacies**







600+ orders later...






The big finding

- Most resources are cheap and plentiful
- Replacement cost < expected profit
 - This is why shutting down domains and Web sites is unlikely to ever work
- One major exception...




Merchant banks (circa late '10)





Anecdotal evidence: Revenue by drug type (RX-Promo)





Nice academic result, but so what?

- A stew of activities
 - Encouragement from D.C.
 - Brand interest
 - Card association cooperation
 - Complex politics around SOPA/PIPA/etc
- Two major changes
 - Visa Global Brand Protection Program (GBPP)
 - Targeted merchant intervention (IACC & brands)





Targeted payment intervention today

- Undercover test purchase at counterfeit site
 - Get merchant bank BIN from transaction
- IP holder notifies card network (e.g., Visa/MC)
 - Investigation; complaint delivered to merchant bank
- Leverage via card association contract
 - Merchant bank owns liability
 - Fines, increased scrutiny, de-association
- Merchant account shutdown



So... does it work?

- Bottom line: Yes, amazingly well.
- We've tracked bank association w/affiliate programs for almost two years (continuing...)
 - ~1000 purchases (Visa only)
- Joined programs as affiliates to get damage assessment from inside
- Quick stories: OEM software and Pharma



Major OEM affiliates


















БОЛНЕНИЙ ИЗВЕСТОП!














OEM software story


- Microsoft's Thanksgiving present (Nov '11)
 - Methodically issued complaints for accounts of every major affiliate program





Qualitative Timeline

11/2011: Microsoft starts merchant complaint actions





Today

- OEM software market has been decimated
 - 90% of programs have folded
 - New startups (softbuy) shut down quickly
- Affiliates still operating won't sell Microsoft software




The pharma story


- Much more developed ecosystem
- Intervention less focused, less comprehensive, less follow up
- Still significant impact...



Medinc.biz




Glavmed





OxoPharm






Cashadmin

To all Cashadmin affiliates,

RX industry is under attack from all sides. Recently, we have lost our credit card processing abilities several times, and it has come to the point where we are losing more money processing orders than we are getting from the orders themselves. The industry has become impossible to manage and maintain. Cashadmin has closed its sites...



Life is tough all around...



"Right now most affiliate programs have a mass of declines, cancels and pendings, and it doesn't depend much on the program imho, there is a general sad picture, fucking Visa is burning us with napalm (for problematic countries, it's totally fucked, on a couple of programs you're lucky if you get 50% through)."



Pharma programs accepting US Visa purchases in 2011











DRUGS www.33drugs.com





EvaPharmacy



















network





cash















Pharma programs accepting US Visa purchases today





















Summary

- Our research is driven by two beliefs
 - Effective intervention will require reasoning about the economic/social structure of our adversaries
 - This reasoning should be informed by empirical measurement data and fieldwork
- This research agenda is both achievable and has the opportunity for major impact (both for research and the real world)



